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Building on previous family firm succession research (e.g., Davis & Harveston, 1998;
Matthews, Moore, & Fialko, 1999; Miller et al., 2003; Sharma, Chrisman, Pablo, & Chua,
2001; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2000), we seek to understand the factors that influence
postsuccession success by focusing on the postsuccession agency of successors. As a
foundation for this investigation, we first develop the idea of postsuccession managerial
discretion of successors (cf. Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) by introducing the notion of
successor discretion to capture the human agency aspect of managerial discretion in
succession (Bandura, 2001). This then permits us to investigate the moderating effect of
family business on the factors that are thought to affect successor discretion. Our argument is that because of individual-level differences, some successors are not as free to take
the risks necessary to maintain the family firm’s entrepreneurial edge and maximize a
family’s wealth, and that this lack of agency can be exacerbated by family firm-level
factors. In this way, our research contributes not only to the family business literature in
its focus on postsuccession success in family firms, but also to the broader literature on
discretion and succession, where the family business represents a uniquely positioned
microcosm for understanding a broader phenomenon.
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we develop the construct of successor
discretion to extend the construct of managerial discretion using an agency lens and
discuss its importance in both nonfamily and family firms. Second, we review the expectations of managerial discretion research as it relates to successor discretion and investigate the impact of the family business on these relationships. Finally, we discuss the
theoretical and practical implications of our model vis-à-vis the question of why some
firms (especially family firms) are able to successfully manage succession while others are
not, offering several suggestions for future research.

Agency, Successor Discretion, and Postsuccession Success
Agency and Successor Discretion
Our work draws upon previous research that has addressed intergenerational succession in family firms and the factors and processes that affect the long-term survival of such
firms (e.g., Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2004; Matthews et al., 1999; Olson et al.,
2003; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2000). Succession in
family firms refers to the transfer of managerial control from one generation to the next
(Shepherd & Zacharakis). This process of transferring control is one that is often fraught
with challenges (Miller et al., 2003). For instance, prior research indicates that founders
who maintain influence after they have largely removed themselves from operational
responsibilities (Davis & Harveston, 1998) can negatively affect successors’ job satisfaction and the overall success of succession (Sharma et al., 2001, 2003). Additionally, the
entrenchment of previous generations can be problematic because it inhibits the ability of
successors to make needed strategic adjustments (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). Central to
our thesis is the idea that beyond the factors that may inhibit successor control there also
exist factors that enable it (e.g., the individual makeup, skills, and abilities of successors).
In this way, research into the succession process needs to consider the willingness of
incumbents to transfer control, the willingness of successors to take it, as well as successors’ subsequent level of commitment to and decision making for the family (Sharma
et al., 2001).
We build upon these elements by adopting a human-agency perspective (e.g., Bandura,
2001) of family business postsuccession success that is situated in, and extends, the concept
of managerial discretion. Managerial discretion has been defined to be “latitude of action”

(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987, p. 371) and “is a function of (1) the degree to which the
environment allows variety and change; (2) the degree to which the organization itself is
amenable to an array of possible actions and empowers the chief executive to formulate and
execute those actions; and (3) the degree to which the chief executive personally is able to
envision or create multiple courses of action” (Hambrick & Finkelstein, p. 379, emphasis
added). While the task environment and the organization are both central to managerial
discretion (representing the bulk of the research), our agency-based approach to postsuccession success—wherein agency is described as the ability “to intentionally make things
happen by one’s actions” (Bandura, p. 2)—centers on this third (individual) dimension: the
ability to envision and create future courses of action.
While research on managerial discretion received significant attention following its
introduction, most of this research focused on the environmental and organizational
dimensions (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Peteraf
& Reed, 2007). What attention has been given to the individual-centric dimension of
managerial discretion has been relatively limited (e.g., Carpenter & Golden, 1997). Our
research represents an attempt to elaborate on this individual-centric dimension of managerial discretion by highlighting the agency of the chief executive successor. Whereas
managerial discretion refers to latitude of action, our agency approach expands upon this
notion by suggesting that successors’ decisions produce important firm-level consequences (Aldrich, 1999). In doing so, we not only bound our study to the chief executive
family successor, but also acknowledge that elements of our theorizing can also apply to
nonfamily successors in family firms, as well as nonfamily firms.
Central to an agentic approach to postsuccession success are four core features of
agency (Bandura, 2001): intentionality (i.e., plans of action), forethought (i.e., expectations of future events), self-reactiveness (i.e., motivation and self-regulation), and selfreflectiveness (i.e., examinations of one’s own functioning). The idea is that successful
successors are likely to display these features in their actions. And just as these core
features of agency enable individuals to engage in “self-development, adaptation, and
self-renewal in the face of change” (Bandura, p. 2), so too should they enable successors
to develop, adapt, and renew the family firm in the face of change. In our treatment of
managerial discretion, we make explicit the notion of human agency by introducing the
construct of successor discretion, which elaborates upon Hambrick and Finkelstein’s
(1987) third (individual) dimension of managerial discretion as described previously: the
ability to envision and create future courses of action.
We define successor discretion as the extent to which successors are free and willing
to formulate, modify, and enact future plans for the renewal of the company. This
conceptualization not only partially encompasses the concept of managerial discretion
as outlined previously (e.g., Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) but also extends it by (1)
drawing attention to successors’ agency as a primary mechanism for envisioning and
creating courses of action and (2) highlighting the need for considering future success in
discretion. It does so by focusing on the ability of successors to formulate, modify, and enact
future-oriented plans of action in the midst of a changing firm environment. Additionally,
by establishing successor discretion as a refinement of the larger construct of managerial
discretion, we explicitly introduce to discretion research the notion of constraints on choice
(Bandura, 2001). Successor discretion, therefore, is not defined solely by a successor’s
formal role within the firm, but rather, consistent with emerging literature on human agency
(Bandura; Searle, 2001), derives from the ability and willingness of successors to shape the
firm’s strategic direction. And while our expectation is that the factors that lead to successor
discretion are generally applicable to all firms, our focal argument is that the impact of these
factors on successor discretion will specifically differ in family businesses.

The Importance of Successor Discretion
We argue that the efficacy of succession strategies—an important and frequently
researched question in both family (e.g., Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Sharma et al.,
2001; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2000) and nonfamily firms (e.g., Rubenson & Gupta,
1996; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992; Wasserman, 2003)—hinges on the key issue
of the establishment of successor discretion on the part of the successor. In general, the
success and wealth created by the actions of an entrepreneurial founder can make it easy
to keep the strategies of predecessors (family or nonfamily) intact. In these situations, the
core capabilities that led to past success for the firm can be inappropriate for the future and
can instead result in core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Such core rigidities can make
it increasingly difficult for successors to take new risks and adapt a business to a changing
economic landscape. But such an ability to adjust to change by changing strategies is
critical for long-term success (e.g., Smith & Grimm, 1987) even if risk and change also
heighten the possibility of failure. In this way, successor discretion can be said to enable
corporate entrepreneurship, which involves the creation of new business within an existing
organization and/or the transformation of that organization (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990, p. 5).
And while there is risk involved in corporate entrepreneurship, it also enables the renewal
of the organization and can result in improved long-term performance (Zahra & Covin,
1995).
While important for all firms, corporate entrepreneurship is particularly important
for family businesses because of their inherent (and potentially change-independent)
longevity. Of course, with a need to be entrepreneurial also comes risk. But undertaking
risk in the pursuit of innovative ideas and concepts is important for the family business
to remain competitive in a dynamic environment (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003). And
although corporate entrepreneurship is important for family firms, it may not come
easily due to concerns about risk and constraints that are imposed as a result of family
control (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006). Compounding this issue, particularly in the
case of chief executive family successors, is the fact that family firms’ choice set for
family successors is (naturally) more limited than for nonfamily firms. As such, it is
critical for key decision makers in family firms to understand which factors are relevant
to successor discretion and which of those factors are within their control. In this way,
our study seeks to address the factors that put successors in a position to look beyond
the practices established by founders and apply their own creative energy and risk
taking to bear for the further advancement of the family firm. In the next section, we
summarize the factors that lead to successor discretion in general and then, as our
focus, theorize how factors related to a family firm will affect successor discretion
specifically.

Successor Discretion and the Family Firm
We have introduced the construct of successor discretion to elaborate on the
individual-centric dimension of managerial discretion. Again, this dimension of discretion
focuses on the chief executive successor and the extent to which he or she is able to
envision and create future courses of action (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987, p. 379). In
our use, successor discretion more explicitly introduces successors’ agency as an important element of discretion. Positioned as such, successor discretion is expected to be
affected by factors that are similar to those that affect managerial discretion. In the next
section, we begin with a summary of the individual-level propositions suggested by
Hambrick and Finkelstein (pp. 386–389) that describe a representative set of factors

Figure 1
Successor Discretion and the Family Firm
Family Business
• Wealth preservation-based
inertia (P1-P3)
• Post-succession
involvement (P4)
• Familiness (P5-P6)

Individual Factors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Tolerance of ambiguity (+)
Locus of control (+)
Cognitive complexity (+)
Professional aspiration (+)
Power base (+)
Political acumen (+)
Commitment (-)

Successor Discretion

Note: The “+/-” indicate the expected impact on successor discretion.

expected to lead to successor discretion.1 Then, in line with our central purpose, we
present a set of propositions that examine the effect of family business on successor
discretion.

Factors Affecting Successor Discretion
This section provides a summary of Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) work.2 They
suggest seven factors as being relevant to the individual-centric element of managerial
discretion, and thus successor discretion: tolerance of ambiguity, internal locus of control,
cognitive complexity, aspiration level, power base, political acumen, and commitment.
Because our focus is the discretion of successors, we refer to successor discretion in our
treatment of their propositions. The nature of these propositions is depicted in Figure 1.
The first factor affecting successor discretion is successors’ tolerance of ambiguity
(Furnham & Ribchester, 1995). The logic here is that those successors who are less
tolerant of ambiguity are less likely to contemplate new directions for the firm. Thus, the
greater the tolerance of ambiguity, the greater the successor discretion.
The second factor affecting successor discretion is successors’ locus of control
(Rotter, 1990). Those successors who have a stronger belief that events are beyond their
own control are less likely to exhibit control in their own decision making. These
successors will have a more limited choice set than those successors who have an internal
locus of control. Thus, the more internally focused successors’ locus of control, the
greater the successor discretion.
The third factor affecting successor discretion is successors’ cognitive complexity
(Bieri et al., 1966). The expectation is that those successors who are less cognitively
1. While we expect other individual-level factors to also lead to successor discretion, we limit our focus here
to those factors suggested by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) in an attempt to provide the parsimony
necessary for our treatment of the effect of family business on successor discretion.
2. For a more in-depth treatment, please see Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987).

constrained will have a wider choice set than those who are more cognitively constrained.
Accordingly, the greater the complexity of successors’ cognitive processing abilities, the
greater the successor discretion.
The fourth factor affecting successor discretion is successors’ level of professional
aspiration. Because greater levels of aspiration are expected to be associated with more
and broader search behavior (Cyert & March, 1963), the greater the level of successors’
professional aspiration, the greater the successor discretion.
The fifth factor affecting successor discretion is successors’ power base. The greater
the successors’ power (in terms of ownership, prestige, expertness, etc.) (Finkelstein,
1992), the better enabled they are at considering new (and potentially controversial)
directions for the renewal of the firm. In this way, the greater the successors’ power base,
the greater the successor discretion.
The sixth factor affecting successor discretion is successors’ political acumen. The
notion is that those successors who are politically astute will be better able to enact new
(but again potentially controversial) directions for the firm that could not be considered by
less politically astute successors, thus providing a larger choice set to these successors.
Accordingly, the greater the successors’ political acumen, the greater the successor
discretion.
The seventh factor affecting successor discretion is commitment. The idea is that
while commitment is necessary, too much of it can lead executives to be locked into
specific courses of action (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), which can constrain future
options. In this way, the greater the successors’ commitment to a course of action, the less
the successor discretion.

The Family Business and Successor Discretion
While successor discretion is important in all firms, we argue that its importance
is singular in family businesses where the family may have a substantial influence on
the firm and where successors are embedded in a web of complex familial and social
relationships (Mitchell, Morse, & Sharma, 2003). In addition to the challenges that
accompany succession (whether in family or nonfamily firms), there are prominent
characteristics of family firms and family firm succession that we argue successors must
take into account. Three that are salient to our research include: (1) inertia that exists as
a result of a focus on wealth preservation (e.g., Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997); (2)
postsuccession predecessor involvement (e.g., Sharma et al., 2003); and (3) familiness
(e.g., Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999).
While these three aspects of family firms can lead to stability and continuity over time,
they can also lead to the “problems of passage” that can imperil the future of the firm
(Miller et al., 2003, p. 528). By investigating the effect of family business on successor
discretion, we seek to better understand how these problems of passage arise. In nonfamily businesses, where the role of the president/CEO is more broadly construed and
is generally quite independent of the predecessor (Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton,
2002), such problems of passage are not nearly as salient. In this way, the family business
represents a uniquely positioned microcosm for understanding successor discretion in
general. In the next paragraphs we discuss in more depth the nature of these family
business characteristics and then develop the logic for their moderating effect on the
respective factors that lead to successor discretion as conceptualized.
We begin by examining the impact of wealth preservation-based inertia on the
relationships between tolerance of ambiguity, internal locus of control, cognitive complexity, and aspiration level on successor discretion. We then investigate the impact of

postsuccession predecessor involvement on the relationship between power base and
successor discretion. Finally, we consider the impact of familiness on the relationship
between political acumen and commitment on successor discretion. In doing so, we
acknowledge that while these characteristics of family businesses are conceptually distinct, there is a degree of overlap in their impact on successor discretion.

Wealth Preservation-Based Inertia
The first characteristic of family firms that we argue should be taken into account in
successor discretion-based descriptions of succession is the inertia generated as a result
of a focus on wealth preservation. Carney (2005) suggested that family firms are more
concerned with the conservation and allocation of resources than nonfamily firms because
the family wealth is at stake. For this reason, leaders of a family business may become
conservative and unwilling to take entrepreneurial risks (Sharma et al., 1997) to enact key
changes within the family firm (Chandler, 1990; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). This focus
on conserving family wealth creates strong family firm-specific inertial forces in the form
of institutionalized “best practices” (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984), which encourage
successors to persist in current strategies and discourage them from taking entrepreneurial
risks. We again emphasize that while inertial forces may be present in family and
nonfamily firms alike, the unique element of trying to maintain family wealth strengthens
inertial forces in family firms. In the next paragraphs, we discuss the impact of wealth
preservation-based inertia on the relationships underlying successor discretion.
Family Business, Tolerance of Ambiguity, and Locus of Control. Previously, we
described the impact of both tolerance of ambiguity and internal locus of control on
successor discretion (cf. Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Tolerance of ambiguity is
defined as the way in which individuals “perceive and process information about ambiguous situations or stimuli when confronted by an array of unfamiliar, complex, or incongruent clues” (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995, p. 179). Internal locus of control, on the other
hand, is defined as the degree to which individuals expect that an outcome is contingent
on their own behavior/personal characteristics as opposed to outside forces (Rotter, 1990).
While clearly distinct traits, both have in common a dispositional basis in personality,
making them prone to stability. This shared element leads to similar expectations for
both tolerance of ambiguity and locus of control vis-à-vis the effects of family business,
leading us to consider both elements in conjunction.
In their discussion of the impact of locus of control on discretion, Carpenter and
Golden (1997) provided a logic underlying the role of personality characteristics in
discussions of discretion. They noted that the “personality–situation interactionism” perspective would indicate a differential impact of dispositional traits on behavior based on
the nature of the situation (Mischel, 1977; Weiss & Adler, 1984). The idea is that in strong
situations—those in which there is a shared understanding of both the interpretations of
issues and appropriate responses to those issues—the impact of dispositional factors is
decreased (Carpenter & Golden, p. 189). As we have described it, a family business
situation that affects wealth preservation and leads to inertia is reflective of a strong
situation as it is defined in the literature (Mischel; Weiss & Adler). In this way, preserving
wealth denotes an adherence to the accepted practices and accepted rules of the past,
which thus serve to constrain the direction of future behavior (Weiss & Adler, p. 20). In
such strong situations, the effects of traits will decrease. Thus,
Proposition 1a: In a family business, wealth preservation-based inertia will attenuate
the positive effect of a successor’s tolerance of ambiguity on successor discretion.

Proposition 1b: In a family business, wealth preservation-based inertia will attenuate
the positive effect of a successor’s internal locus of control on successor discretion.
Family Business and Cognitive Complexity. In contrast to tolerance of ambiguity and
locus of control, cognitive complexity is not solely dispositional in nature. Rather, it
reflects a combination of dispositional and situational elements (Woike & Aronoff, 1992).
Our theorizing on the subject reflects this relationship. As noted, increases in cognitive
complexity are expected to increase successor discretion (cf. Hambrick & Finkelstein,
1987). According to Bieri et al. (1966), cognitive complexity refers to “the capacity to
construe social behavior in a multidimensional way” (p. 185). In relation to successor
discretion, successors who exhibit greater complexity in cognitive processing abilities are
able to create broader decision sets as a result of their ability to perceive opportunities
embedded in dynamic environments (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006). Stated differently,
executives with higher levels of cognitive complexity are less likely to accept generic,
monolithic interpretations of changes in the environment, but instead understand how to
translate these nuanced changes into meaningful opportunities.
But as noted, wealth preservation-based inertial pressures in family firms can limit
the range of acceptable practices within the firm. The result of these limitations is the
restriction of the opportunity choice set of cognitively complex family business successors
(White, Smith, & Barnett, 1994). When combined with a cognitive context that is already
highly complex (Mitchell et al., 2003), the benefits of greater cognitive complexity on the
part of successors are diminished. By enforcing family norms governing the appropriateness of behavior in an already complex cognitive environment (Handler, 1992), wealth
preservation-based inertial pressures weaken the ability of successors to enact strategic
changes in response to the recognition of emerging opportunities. Accordingly,
Proposition 2: In a family business, wealth preservation-based inertia will attenuate
the positive effect of a successor’s cognitive complexity on successor discretion.
Family Business and Professional Aspiration. As noted, the professional aspirations of
successors are expected to increase successor discretion (cf. Hambrick & Finkelstein,
1987) because individuals with high aspirations are expected to engage in broader search
(Cyert & March, 1963) and thus should have more options available. In family firms,
however, the high aspirations of successors may be countered by a tendency to preserve
wealth (Carney, 2005), leading to an unwillingness to take entrepreneurial risks (Sharma
et al., 1997). Ironically, this tendency might be in spite of higher aspirations, or may even
reflect a refocusing of aspirations on wealth preservation. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2000)
explain this wealth-preservation behavior through the use of the “endowment effect”
concept (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). The logic is that individuals tend to
be motivated to protect that which they own more than they tend to pursue other opportunities of similar value. When considering that executives of family firms typically enjoy
longer tenures than those in nonfamily firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz,
2001) and that the endowment effect is likely to increase with time (Strahilevitz &
Loewenstein, 1998), we expect successors in a family firm to focus their aspirations on
wealth preservation rather than wealth generation, thereby limiting their focus on future
plans for the renewal of the company. Therefore,
Proposition 3: In a family business, wealth preservation-based inertia will attenuate
the positive effect of a successor’s professional aspirations on successor discretion.

Postsuccession Predecessor Involvement
In addition to inertial forces generated as a result of a focus on wealth preservation,
the second characteristic of family firms that we argue should be taken into account
when considering successor discretion is postsuccession involvement of predecessors.
Past research has cited predecessors’ reluctance to step aside as one of the most severe
problems related to succession in family firms (e.g., Sharma et al., 2001). As such, it
represents an important moderator to consider when examining succession in family firms
(Sharma et al.). Predecessors typically enjoy a central role in the business they created or
developed and are reluctant to give up control (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996). The ability to
exercise influence in both the family and business spheres of the family firm (see, e.g.,
Holland & Boulton, 1984) allows executives of family firms to enjoy longer tenures than
those in nonfamily firms (Schulze et al., 2001) and to influence decisions even after the
succession, regardless of the formal role they retain (Davis & Harveston, 1998). The
continual involvement of predecessors decreases successors’ satisfaction with the succession process (Sharma et al., 2003) and increases conflict in the family firm (Davis &
Harveston, 1999). We next discuss how predecessor involvement moderates the relationship between successors’ power base and successor discretion.
Family Business and Power Base. The more power successors have, the more successor
discretion they will have (cf. Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). However, even after the
transition of formal authority from the predecessor to successor, predecessors may retain
influential informal power within the firm, undermining the power of the successor (Davis
& Harveston, 1998). While predecessor involvement may be present in both family and
nonfamily firms, unique aspects of family firms increase the likelihood of this situation, as
well as increasing the magnitude of its negative effects, as previously discussed.
While predecessors may make useful contributions to the family firm after a succession (e.g., as advisors or mentors), such continued involvement poses a potential threat to
the successor’s power base. In addition to their continued business-related involvement,
predecessors in family firms are able to stay involved and influential in ways that predecessors in nonfamily firms cannot (Davis & Harveston, 1999). Specifically, even after
formal business ties are cut and formal power is transferred from the predecessor to
successor, family ties typically remain between predecessors and other members of the
family in family firms but are rarely present in nonfamily firms. Additionally, there is an
expectation that predecessors are likely to retain a senior and influential position in the
family side of the family-business dyad and substantial firm ownership (Davis & Harveston). These ties may draw loyalty away from the successor and to the predecessor,
thwarting the successor’s ability to “formulate, modify, and enact future plans.” Thus,
Proposition 4: In a family business, predecessor involvement in the firm attenuates
the positive effect of a successor’s power base on successor discretion.

Familiness
The third characteristic of family firms that we argue should be taken into account in
discussions of successor discretion is reflected in the notion of “familiness” (Habbershon
& Williams, 1999; Habbershon, Williams, & Macmillan, 2003). While familiness is most
frequently viewed in a positive, constructive light (Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008),
some suggest that familiness can be an encumbrance to performance when it is not
properly managed (as in the case of familiness-based free-riding problems [Habbershon &
Williams; Sharma, 2008]. In our use of the concept, we focus on the positive, constructive

side of familiness—often termed distinctive familiness (Habbershon & Williams; Habbershon et al.)—which involves a more resilient trust and a greater congruence in goals
(Habbershon & Williams; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). In our use of distinctive familiness, we explore the possibility that consequences of familiness stemming from successor
discretion exist that are particularly relevant to family firms.
Familiness has been defined as “resources and capabilities related to family involvement and interactions” (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003, p. 468). This concept taps into
the idea that what makes family firms different from nonfamily firms is the central role
that family plays within firms (Pearson et al., 2008). The role of family and the complex
interrelationships between family interests, business interests, and individual interests
set family firms apart from nonfamily firms and underscores a critically unique dimension of family firms. We argue that familiness, along with the complex family relationships that underlie it, is an important force within family firms that moderates
relationships between certain individual-centric attributes of successors and successor
discretion. We now discuss two such relationships: political acumen and commitment
of successors.
Family Business and Political Acumen. Political acumen represents successors’ ability
to effectively use the power that they possess, which (as noted) leads to successor
discretion (cf. Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). In family firms, however, successors must
contend not only with political and power issues common to all firms, but must also
contend with complex family relationships and the “familiness” of the firm. As described,
familiness represents a unique bundle of resources and capabilities that distinguishes
family firms from nonfamily firms (Chua et al., 1999). One important outcome of familiness is that it allows family firms to develop a unique type of social capital that nonfamily
firms are unable to develop (Carney, 2005). Social capital is a broad concept that focuses
on connections among individuals that facilitate trust, cohesiveness, and the pursuit of
uniform goals (Adler & Kwon, 2002). It taps into the complex relationships within firms
and is built over time in intricate and inimitable patterns (Pearson et al., 2008). While
all firms can develop social capital, family firms are able to leverage their familiness
and develop far more extensive and intricate layers of social capital because of the
added complex family relational elements (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). This
familiness-based social capital thus comprises a unique resource of family firms and can
lead to positive outcomes.
We argue that one such positive outcome of familiness-based social capital is that it
facilitates successors’ use of political acumen as a result of the associated trust and
cohesiveness it generates. This is because in situations of greater trust and cohesion,
individuals within firms would be more trusting and accepting of the decisions and actions
of successors (Miller et al., 2003). In such an environment, it would be easier for successors to exercise their political acumen and make decisions in the best interest of the firm.
Thus, we argue that familiness-based social capital is an important positive moderator of
the relationship between political acumen and successor discretion. Accordingly,
Proposition 5: In a family business, familiness magnifies the positive effect of a
successor’s political acumen on successor discretion.
Family Business and Commitment. The effect of familiness on successor discretion is
not limited to its positive interaction with political acumen. Commitment of successors
has also been identified as an important attribute (e.g., Sharma & Irving, 2005). But as we
have previously noted, too strong a commitment can result in successors being locked into

a particular course of action, limiting the array of alternatives of which they are aware
or to which they give credence, thereby decreasing successor discretion (cf. Hambrick
& Finkelstein, 1987). Our argument is that in family firms, this problem is likely to be
compounded.
As previously discussed, familiness in a family firm is built on the complex family,
firm, and individual relationships within firms (Pearson et al., 2008) and can be a basis
of competitive advantage for family firms (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). Among its
other positive characteristics (e.g., a greater sense of trust and cohesiveness), familiness
also provides a “transgenerational pursuance” of vision and purpose for the family firm
(Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2005, p. 238). When looked at in terms of successor discretion, this overarching sense of continuity may be seen to encourage successors not to seek
new opportunities, but rather to further develop and build upon existing strategies in an
effort to further enhance the family firm’s familiness. Thus, as a result of the familiness of
the firm and out of a desire to further nurture the trust and cohesion that has heretofore
preserved the family firm—thereby avoiding conflict (cf. Habbershon & Williams)—
successors may actually increase commitment to predecessors’ strategies. Paradoxically,
then, because of a regenerative focus on renewing distinctive familiness, the familiness of
family firms may actually reduce successor discretion. Therefore,
Proposition 6: In a family business, familiness magnifies the negative effect of
commitment on successor discretion.
As we have described, there are certain characteristics of family firms and family firm
succession that combine to affect successor discretion, some positively and some negatively. As the tension we describe in our introduction suggests, the net effect of these
characteristics would seem to imperil the family firm’s existence in the very act of trying
to facilitate its longevity. Our assertion is that by understanding both successor discretion
and the characteristics of family firms that affect it, successors and predecessors can
resolve this tension.

Discussion
In the beginning of Anna Karenina, Leo Tolstoy asserts that “happy families are all
alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” When applied to the context of
intergenerational family firms, we disagree with his observation. We do so because it
would seem to suggest that while theory can adequately explain successful transitions in
the family business from one generation to the next (Sharma et al., 2001, 2003), it is not
able to explain those that have failed. It is our belief, however, that the causes of both
successful and failed successions can be explained through theory, and as a result may be
effected in practice. As we have just reiterated, there is an unhappy reality that the
considerable longevity that many family firms enjoy is imperiled by the very processes
that are necessary for their continued existence. Our efforts to develop the idea of
successor discretion augment family business theory with the aim of improving family
business practice. We now address both the theoretical and practical implications of our
work.

Theoretical Implications
We have introduced the construct of successor discretion as an attempt to better
understand the “problems of passage” (Miller et al., 2003) that can exist in family firms. As

a foundation for our development of this construct, we rely upon the concept of managerial
discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) as a basis for us to then explicitly address
the human agency element (Bandura, 2001) that we argue exists in successor discretion.
With managerial discretion as the basis of our development of successor discretion, we thus
acknowledge that successor discretion can apply to all firms, not just family firms. Our line
of reasoning, however, is that the concept of successor discretion, as we have defined it, is
central to the “problems of passage” that arise in family firm succession. Our propositions
develop the logic underlying this expectation and thus build on the growing literature that
focuses on succession (e.g., Miller et al.; Sharma et al., 2001).
In addressing problems of passage in family business succession, our theorizing has
been focused almost exclusively on understanding those elements of family firms that
can magnify problems of passage. However, as our proposition on the interaction between
familiness and political acumen exemplifies (proposition 5) factors exist—family firmbased, but also individual-based—that can attenuate problems of passage through the
development of successor discretion. We might expect, for instance, that a successor’s
self-efficacy (e.g., Wood & Bandura, 1989) or previous involvement in a family firm
would increase successor discretion. Additional research is therefore needed to further
develop theory that describes how individual-level factors underlying successor discretion
can combine with family-level factors to positively affect the strategic behavior of
successors. Moreover, further research is needed to understand the implications of the
suggestion that distinctive familiness may attenuate successor discretion.
It might be said that the configuration of our proposed model represents a structuralist
argument whereby external factors (i.e., characteristics of a family business) constrain
and/or limit the effects of individual-level factors on successor discretion. But the picture
is not so simple. Our approach to understanding postsuccession success is based on social
cognitive theory (see Wood & Bandura, 1989), which in its most basic sense describes
how individual, environmental, and behavioral factors are “interacting determinants that
influence each other bidirectionally” (Wood & Bandura, p. 362, emphasis added). Stated
differently, our agency-based approach to postsuccession success (e.g., Bandura, 2001)
is based on the idea that: (1) individual-level differences combine with certain family
firm-based characteristics to jointly impact successor discretion, and (2) that through
successor discretion, successors work to transform the very structure of the family firm
itself, thereby changing the nature of its impact on individual-level factors (Giddens,
1979). In this way, our research is squarely centered in a theory of human agency that
emphasizes the duality of agency and structure.
In adopting a social cognitive approach to family business succession success, we thus
build on a tradition of research that illustrates the importance of individual-level factors
for decision makers in both organizations in general (e.g., Miller & Dröge, 1986) and in
family businesses specifically (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2003). By doing so, this paper represents a foundation for future empirical research investigating the role of agency and
cognition in family business-based entrepreneurial action. Our paper also represents a step
forward in differentiating between entrepreneurial decision makers in the family business
context (cf. Sarasvathy, 2004). By understanding the factors that lead to successor discretion, we can better understand the differences in successors’ responses to and impact
on change in the family business. Moreover, in probing the agency dimension of family
business succession, we have identified several ways in which research on successor
discretion in family firms can not only constructively advance family business research,
but can also enhance understanding of discretion and succession in general.
While we have established successor discretion as a factor that can affect productive
change following succession in a family business, nonetheless a number of unanswered

questions still exist. One important question is the specific nature of the relationship
between successor discretion and corporate entrepreneurship in family firms (e.g.,
Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006). Specifically, we argue here that successor discretion
affects the level of corporate entrepreneurship in family firms because it allows successors to implement change that is necessary to generate family wealth and thereby
enhance the long-term viability of the family firm. What is not clear, however, is how
successor discretion might impact the shorter-term survival of family firms. Indeed,
greater successor discretion may entail taking greater risks that, while important to the
long-term success of the firm (Zahra & Covin, 1995), nonetheless may endanger the
family business in the short run. The complexities of these relationships have yet to be
explored.

Practical Implications
Warren Buffett observed that society has an obligation to ensure that success is based
on merit as opposed to inheritance (Thomas, 2006). The enhancement of successor
discretion, as we have defined it here, represents a pathway for successors (both family
and nonfamily) to achieve merit-based success through the use of agency. Herein, we
briefly discuss how decision makers in family firms specifically can achieve such success
in practice. We discuss these implications from the perspective of both predecessors and
successors.
Herein, we have developed the idea that certain individual characteristics can impact
successor discretion. By understanding the factors that can lead to successor discretion and
those that can detract from it, predecessors in a family business can proactively work to seek
out and develop those characteristics in successors that will lead to increased successor
discretion. For instance, predecessors could assist successors in developing political
acumen. Because family business characteristics also exist that can impact successor
discretion, predecessors should also seek to structure the family firm in a way that enables
successor discretion. For instance, this might be done through the institutionalization of
a belief that executives are not merely guardians of created wealth, but rather creators
of new wealth. In a sense, the development of successor discretion represents a type of
succession planning (e.g., Davis & Harveston, 1998) that begins long before succession.
An underlying premise in our research is the idea that successors must be willing and
free to depart from the strategies of predecessors. Predecessors, for their part, enable such
discretion by being willing to step aside. We do not want this to be taken, however, as an
argument in favor of predecessor disengagement from the family firm. Indeed, such
disengagement could be a detriment if relevant experience, expertise, and social capital
(among other factors) of predecessors go unused. Instead, we suggest that predecessor
involvement in the family firm be targeted in a way that successor discretion is fostered.
For instance, predecessors can consistently signal their commitment to successors’
courses of action (whatever the actions, large or small) and their willingness to share
expertise, but should do so with the understanding that this involvement is subordinate to
successor discretion. The key is that successor discretion be understood as having
primacy. Moreover, it may be that such an approach on the part of predecessors will both
increase successors’ satisfaction with the succession process (cf. Sharma et al., 2003) and
decrease conflict in the family firm (cf. Davis & Harveston, 1999).
For their part, successors to a family business can enable successor discretion by
taking opportunities to develop those individual characteristics that are positively related
to discretion. This might be done through the development of one’s own aspirations in the
family firm. An irony is that while developing family business aspirations, successors

should also attempt to develop a view of the business that is independent of its past
behavior. By so doing, successors can put themselves in a position to formulate, modify,
and enact future plans for the renewal of the company by making critical strategic choices
for the firm that are jointly impacted by both their own thinking and the situational factors
introduced by the family business. In this way, each generation of leadership in a family
business can make a mark: Successor discretion simply ensures these marks entail a new
path rather than the retreading of old ground.
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